Event

Feb 9, 2023
The Validity of Machine Learning Models for the Measurement of Personality Traits

In the last 15 years or so, the use of big data and machine learning has gained traction in some areas of personality psychology (Rauthmann 2020): While traditional personality research relies largely on self-reports and third-person assessments, the new area of “personality computing” (Vinciarelli & Mohammadi 2014) promises to be more unobtrusive and deliver data from subjects’ everyday behavior, such as cell-phone use and “likes” on social media, which are processed by machine learning algorithms to produce predictions about personality traits and behaviors. Some commentators have hailed this method as a new psychometric tool, which can compete with (and will perhaps replace) old-fashioned questionnaire-based personality tests (Boyd et al 2020) and which has the advantage of using naturally occurring behaviors (Furr 2009).
If we view personality computing as a tool of psychometric measurement, the question is how it fares with regard to standard criteria of test evaluation, such as validity (Harari et al 2020; Phan & Rauthmann 2021; Bleidorn & Hopwood 2020). In my talk, I will pick up on some recent discussions about the construct validity of PC-models. I will begin by explaining the notion of construct validity as a property of both, tests and constructs. For example, if a test is claimed to measure the purported personality trait of introversion, it has construct validity if it in fact measures introversion, which in turn means that the construct (=concept) introversion has a legitimate referent. Within psychology, it is, however, highly controversial what standards of evidence have to be met in order for a test to have construct validity. Two opposing sides focus on either correlational or experimental evidence (Borsboom et al 2004). Advocates of the former approach look for correlations between different measures of the same thing, whereas advocates of the latter demand that the data produced by the test in fact be caused by the phenomenon under investigation. (Feest 2020)
I will argue that while the outputs of PC models appear to be correlated with the outcomes of traditional personality measures, the precise targets of those traditional personality measures remain contested. Moreover, big data are typically “mobilized from a variety of sources” (Leonelli 2020), which means that the material circumstances of their production recede into the background and the data become decontextualized. In turn, this means that their quality as evidence for the phenomena in question (and thus the validity of the PC models that utilize them) cannot easily be established (Feest 2022). I will conclude that while all of this does not negate the potential heuristic fruitfulness of PC models, it strongly suggests that these models need to be supplemented with theoretical and experimental work, which should (a) articulate and develop the relevant constructs, and (b) establish the suitability of the data as evidence. 

Biography

Address
Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Boltzmannstraße 22, 14195 Berlin, Germany
Room
Zoom/Online Meeting Platform
Contact and Registration

The talk will take place on zoom, please briefly register with Birgitta v. Mallinckrodt (officekeuck@mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de) to receive the link.

2023-02-09T15:00:00SAVE IN I-CAL 2023-02-09 15:00:00 2023-02-09 16:30:00 The Validity of Machine Learning Models for the Measurement of Personality Traits In the last 15 years or so, the use of big data and machine learning has gained traction in some areas of personality psychology (Rauthmann 2020): While traditional personality research relies largely on self-reports and third-person assessments, the new area of “personality computing” (Vinciarelli & Mohammadi 2014) promises to be more unobtrusive and deliver data from subjects’ everyday behavior, such as cell-phone use and “likes” on social media, which are processed by machine learning algorithms to produce predictions about personality traits and behaviors. Some commentators have hailed this method as a new psychometric tool, which can compete with (and will perhaps replace) old-fashioned questionnaire-based personality tests (Boyd et al 2020) and which has the advantage of using naturally occurring behaviors (Furr 2009). If we view personality computing as a tool of psychometric measurement, the question is how it fares with regard to standard criteria of test evaluation, such as validity (Harari et al 2020; Phan & Rauthmann 2021; Bleidorn & Hopwood 2020). In my talk, I will pick up on some recent discussions about the construct validity of PC-models. I will begin by explaining the notion of construct validity as a property of both, tests and constructs. For example, if a test is claimed to measure the purported personality trait of introversion, it has construct validity if it in fact measures introversion, which in turn means that the construct (=concept) introversion has a legitimate referent. Within psychology, it is, however, highly controversial what standards of evidence have to be met in order for a test to have construct validity. Two opposing sides focus on either correlational or experimental evidence (Borsboom et al 2004). Advocates of the former approach look for correlations between different measures of the same thing, whereas advocates of the latter demand that the data produced by the test in fact be caused by the phenomenon under investigation. (Feest 2020) I will argue that while the outputs of PC models appear to be correlated with the outcomes of traditional personality measures, the precise targets of those traditional personality measures remain contested. Moreover, big data are typically “mobilized from a variety of sources” (Leonelli 2020), which means that the material circumstances of their production recede into the background and the data become decontextualized. In turn, this means that their quality as evidence for the phenomena in question (and thus the validity of the PC models that utilize them) cannot easily be established (Feest 2022). I will conclude that while all of this does not negate the potential heuristic fruitfulness of PC models, it strongly suggests that these models need to be supplemented with theoretical and experimental work, which should (a) articulate and develop the relevant constructs, and (b) establish the suitability of the data as evidence.  Biography Uljana Feest Uljana Feest studied psychology, philosophy and history and philosophy of science (HPS) in Frankfurt, Bristol and Pittsburgh. After completing her psychology degree at the Goethe-Universität in Frankfurt (1994), she worked for a couple of years as a researcher in an interdisciplinary project at a Frankfurt-based research institute (Institut für Sozial-Oekologische Forschung), before taking up graduate work in philosophy of science. From 1997-2003 she was a graduate student at the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, completing her dissertation, Operationism, Experimentation, and Concept Formation, in August 2003. From 2003-2006, Uljana Feest was a researcher at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science (Berlin) and then held a position as assistant professor at the Technische Universität (TU) Berlin from 2006 to 2012. She has been a visiting researcher at the University of Pittsburg, the University of Michigan and the Max Planck Institute for Human Development (Berlin). Since March 2014, she is professor of philosophy at the Leibniz University of Hannover, where she holds the chair for Philosophy of Social Science and Social Philosophy. In her research, Uljana Feest focuses on the ways in which methodological and conceptual questions are entwined in the investigative practices of experimental scientists, with a special focus on psychological experiments. Broadly speaking, her research is located at the intersection of philosophy of experimentation, philosophy of psychology, the history of 19th/20th-century philosophy and science, and some aspects of philosophy of mind.  Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Boltzmannstraße 22, 14195 Berlin, Germany Zoom/Online Meeting Platform Lara KeuckSteeves Demazeux Lara KeuckSteeves Demazeux Europe/Berlin public