Al-Fārābī: *The Five Aphorisms*

Marw, Baghdad, Aleppo, Damascus, Constantinople, and Cairo, late ninth/first half of the tenth century CE

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Commentary

Explication of al-Fārābī's *The Five Aphorisms*

This short treatise by the medieval Islamic philosopher al-Fārābī (d. AH 338/950 CE) serves as a concise introduction to the whole of philosophic science.[1] It introduces the art of rational argumentation, or what is also called the art of logic. In designating this as an art, al-Fārābī affirms that although knowledge and science are the end, the rational arts are the primary and only means to that end, and these means are derived from the extensive and orderly training in the art rather than from the employment of a more easily learned technique or a method. As an art, he affirms, all knowledge and all science depend upon prescientific knowledge, which is found both in the individual and in the community. Again, as an art, this intellectual art has a resemblance to the practical arts. The rational arts share with the practical arts the need for knowledge in order to accomplish action; at the same time, they are distinguished from the practical arts in that the primary purpose of the rational arts is neither the fulfillment of an action nor the performing of a work but the completion of reasoning, of intellectual activity alone. This intellectual activity al-Fārābī also calls 'syllogistic' thought. In contrast to what more recent accounts of logic seek to attain through a separation between art and science, al-Fārābī presents the rational arts as being at the core of the judgments needed for science. These rational arts are learned faculties or qualities of mind and are embodied in language.

[1] I wish to thank Katja Krause (Max Planck Institute for the History of Science) for organizing this project and Kate Sturge for her usual, meticulous proofreading and perceptive intellectual probing. I also thank the American-Jordanian Fulbright Commission for supporting this project and the University of Jordan for granting me library and office privileges. I am also grateful to Fouad Ben Aḥmad, who proofread my Arabic and made several improvements.

For his entire corpus of writings, al-Fārābī earned a reputation in the Islamic world as being the "Second Teacher" after Aristotle. To be sure, over twelve hundred years separate Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) from al-Fārābī and thus we might ask: What can it mean to say that al-Fārābī is the Second Teacher? Were there no other philosophers during this period who could compare? The appellation of Second Teacher means nothing less than that, in the estimation of the Arabic-speaking world, there were no commentators on Aristotle, no writers in Greek, Syriac, Persian, Latin, or Hebrew, as learned as al-Fārābī. For the nine hundred years following al-Fārābī's death—that is, up until the eighteenth century—he would be regarded by many of his Arabic-speaking colleagues and successors as the most erudite and judicious philosopher after Aristotle.

As an example of a reference to him that indicates the persistence of his commanding presence, his writings continued to be known well into the eighteenth century in Istanbul, one of the centers of religious and scientific learning in the Arabic-speaking and Islamic world at that time, which was famed especially for its copying of philosophic manuscripts, including al-Fārābī's. One of the main scholars in Istanbul, Asʿad al-Yanyawī (d. ca. AH 1143/1731 CE), was a serious advocate of al-Fārābī's account of Aristotle, as we know because al-Yanyawī, and the scribal school under his direction, copied many of al-Fārābī's treatises for the Arabic-speaking world. Al-Fārābī's influence is even more remarkable when we consider that al-Yanyawī lived and was engaged in this work eighty years after the death of René Descartes in 1650 and during the early part of the century in which Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) wrote their literary and philosophical treatises. Al-Yanyawī and his fellow scribes asserted that al-Fārābī's account of Aristotle—and Plato—was still worthy of attention in the eighteenth century. Al-Fārābī's compelling influence is seen as well through his illustrious students in the Classical period of Arabic philosophy: Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d. AH 428/1037 CE), Ibn Bājja (Avempace, d. AH 532/1138 CE), Ibn Rushd (Averroës, d. AH 594/1198 CE), Maimonides (d. AH 4964/1204 CE), and Ibn Ṭumlūs (d. AH 620/1223 CE). Finally, these disciples, as well as the master, are still being read today in Eastern, Middle Eastern, and Western educational institutions—and for more than simply antiquarian interest. It took perceptive research in the twentieth century to notice that al-Fārābī was also deeply learned in Plato and is thus, we may say, the "Second Teacher" of both Aristotle and Plato.[2]

Al-Fārābī's philosophic science consists in a certain ordering of the arts and sciences. He judges that the highest art or the highest science, the one that governs all others and is the basis for the unity of science, is what he calls "human philosophy" or "humane

[2] Leo Strauss, "Farabi's Plato," in *Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume*, ed. Saul Lieberman et al., English section (New York: American Academy of Jewish Research, 1945), 357–93. Douglas M. Dunlop also judges that al-Fārābī knew Plato's treatises well, especially the political dialogues. See al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl al-Madanī: Aphorisms of the Statesman*, ed. and trans. D. M. Dunlop (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 5–8.

philosophy," sometimes "political philosophy." Why is this architectonic or first philosophy identified as "human philosophy" as distinct from the commendable alternatives of metaphysics or of theology itself (the latter being cited often in the Latin world as the "queen of the sciences")? Why is human philosophy or political philosophy placed in this position of governing and unifying the other sciences?

In brief, human philosophy recognizes that the goal of every principle of science and every aspect of knowledge is wisdom and human happiness. We achieve this wisdom and our highest happiness not only individually but as we are part of a community, even if the rational arts must be learned by each one of us, individually. As human beings, we are both rational and political by nature; our growth from potential to actual rational beings is concomitant with our growth from potential to actual political beings, and vice versa. We discover fully what it is to be human as we understand ourselves in relation to the community and adopt our proper place in respect to the community. It was this affirmation of what makes us fully human that, *inter alia*, al-Fārābī learned from Aristotle—and also from Plato—in his study of Greek philosophy.

The humane orientation of all philosophic science is germane to the recognition of the place that religion has in the creation of community. Islam, to say nothing of other religions, is a religion of law and morality—both of which are necessary for community—rather than a religion that leads primarily to theological abstraction or to the mystical devotions of the solitary individual. Our knowledge of love, justice, and mercy is embodied and lived out in our friendships, marriages, families, neighborhoods, cities, nations, and alliances between nations. Thus, true religion and true philosophy have a common goal to lead us to an understanding of the best forms of community and to help us to make judgments regarding the nature of our happiness, both in this world and in the life of the world to come. The purpose of philosophic science and religion is one, and they are at their best when they aim for the flourishing of wisdom and happiness.

Al-Fārābī's short treatise consists of five chapters. They are recognizably written in an aphoristic style, and the Arabic title *Khamṣa Fuṣūl* is properly translated as *Five Aphorisms*.[3] The rhetorical style is brief and condensed, combining simplicity and concision in order to summarize the best that is thought and known on five topics essential to the rational arts. The style is plain and straightforward, and its manner is uncontroversial. The aphorisms contain no polemics, very few references to the history of scholarship, and little direct critical evaluation of other scholars. They are written in the tradition of the ancient Greek medical teacher Hippocrates, whose *Aphorisms* are composed in the same laconic and mnemonic style, providing immediate instruction for

[3] D. M. Dunlop, "Al-Fārābī's Introductory Sections on Logic," *Islamic Quarterly* 2 (1955): 264–82. In this early publication, Dunlop translates *fuṣūl* as "sections," but in his later publication in 1961, of al-Fārābī's treatise *Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, *fuṣūl* is translated as "aphorisms." In the introduction to the 1961 book, Dunlop justifies this translation by its relation to the aphorisms of the medical tradition. Al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, 9–17, especially the quotation from Maimonides, 10.

doctors in their busy practices. Such aphorisms are written as the gathering of the best wisdom from numerous authorities on particular topics.

Aphorism One

Aphorism One is a study of the use of language by the masters of the rational arts. It pertains to the meanings of words, which are the necessary foundation of all the arts and of the argumentation of the rational arts that are, in turn, necessary for all the sciences. A failure to learn how words are used by each art will lead to a failure to understand the knowledge which constitutes that art. Likewise, a failure by the scientist to recognize that a word is used differently from what is commonly accepted will lead to failure both in the ongoing inquiries of the science and in the scientist's task of assisting others to understand the art. Thus, recognition of the differences between commonly used and scientific meanings is necessary both for science and for the common usage by the public. Al-Fārābī gives an example: the term *zimām* (زِمام) is used by medieval Arabic accountants with the sense of 'audit,' but to the general public at that time it meant a bridle for use in the art of horsemanship. Or, as a contemporary example: when we go to the doctor, we need to speak enough common language to help us understand why we are sick and how we can improve and the doctor may need to explain the meaning of specific terms used in the art of medicine in a different way than they are used generally in the science. The rational arts require a distinction between the two or even more meanings of a word if there is to be any precision in the scientific art—nay, if the scientific art is to exist at all.

Al-Fārābī's Aphorism One is a version of Aristotle's account of equivocal (also called "homonymous"), univocal (also called "synonymous"), or paronymous (derived) terms in the first chapter of his first book on logic, that is, the *Categories* (1a1–15). No premise, no statement, no hypothesis, and no argument of any kind in ancient or modern science can ignore the ongoing interinanimation (in John Donne's sense of the term) between the generally accepted and the scientific usage of words.[4] And since language occupies the common human world in which we all meet and converse, sensitivity to the use of words is necessary to both science and community. Scientists keep writing papers, lovers keep writing poems, and neither can afford to say the wrong thing in the wrong context. In order to do science, especially the comprehensive science of which al-Fārābī speaks, it is necessary to recognize and use the appropriate meanings for, in particular, equivocal terms. The public may not know a term is equivocal, but the scientist needs to know. Thus, the topic of this First Aphorism, pertaining to the usage of language, is universal to all the rational arts and therefore to all science.

[4] Interinanimation here means both a mixing and a distinction, as in a phrase in Donne's poem "The Ecstasy": "When love with one another so | interinanimates both souls, | That abler soul, which thence doth flow | Defects of loneliness controls" (lines 41–44).

Aphorism Two

Aphorism Two begins with a distinction between two types of knowledge: knowledge that is known prior to the rational arts and knowledge that is gained through the rational arts. This Aphorism identifies knowledge that is prior to the rational arts. There are four types of such knowledge: 1) received opinions, 2) generally accepted opinions, 3) sense perceptions, and 4) first intelligibles. Received opinions are those that are received from a single authority or determined by a single authority. The term al-Fārābī uses to describe this authority is *murtaḍan* (مُرتَضًى), "an approved one" or "a chosen one," a term used, though not exclusively, of a religious authority, as for example in Qurʾān 72:27 *irtaḍā* (إِرْتَضَى), "he has chosen." Generally accepted opinions are those opinions which are accepted by all people, or by many of them, or at least by a learned group amongst them, or most of the learned group, or perhaps even by one person most notable in wisdom amongst them—but which, in any of these cases, the opinion is not paradoxical (Aristotle, *Topics* I.10, 104a9–12). These generally accepted opinions are available to us or are present in us independently of the rational arts. Their epistemological content varies; they may be false opinions or true opinions or a mixture of the two. The rational arts seek to sort out the veracity of these opinions. As an example of generally accepted opinions which are universal truths, al-Fārābī cites the opinion that "kindness to a parent and gratitude to a benefactor are duties." In other cases, the merit may be less obvious. Sense perception is knowledge that we have received through our five senses. It is neither always accurate nor always orderly, which, to be sure, presents a challenge for any type of empirical scientific investigation. The rational arts will need to examine and order these perceptions. Finally, first intelligibles exist by nature, seem to have always existed for us, and exist without our knowing how we came to them. Al-Fārābī provides several examples, all from mathematics: three is an odd number and four is an even number, the whole is greater than the part, two things which are equal to a third thing are themselves equal, and so on.

What is the significance of these non-demonstrative types of knowledge for al-Fārābī's epistemology and for us today? First of all, the statements derived from this knowledge will need to be analyzed before they can lead to usable premises; their epistemic value will need to be evaluated appropriately. More importantly, according to al-Fārābī, the existence of this non-demonstrative knowledge indicates that humans are not blank slates, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau would later argue. These non-demonstrative forms of knowledge constitute the sense of nature and of the experience we have of the world prior to and alongside analysis by the rational arts. For example, a mother has some knowledge of how to nurture a baby even prior to being mentored, and wisdom in these matters is passed on from generation to generation by mothers and midwives.

Al-Fārābī and his teacher Aristotle (*Posterior Analytics* 71a1–15) are not the only philosophers to hold such a view of the existence of non-demonstrative knowledge. More recently, Michael Polanyi, for example, claimed that all scientific knowledge is based on "tacit knowledge," that is, knowledge we do not obtain through perception and

experimentation.[5] If al-Fārābī, Aristotle, and Polanyi (and others) are correct, science owes a certain debt to community wisdom and cannot exist properly without the community. The purpose of Aphorism Two is to identify specifically the types of non-demonstrative knowledge that are utilized in the formulation of premises for syllogistic or demonstrative arguments in the arts and sciences. Aphorism Two thus enucleates another universal topic that is pertinent to all arts and sciences.

Aphorism Three

Aphorism Three distinguishes all the ways in which an entity can exist in relation to another entity. The most important way of identifying that relation is by understanding that an attribute may be ascribed to an entity that is either accidental or essential in relation to that entity. If an attribute is accidental, we attain no knowledge of the entity to which it is related. If an attribute is essential, we gain knowledge of the whatness of the entity. All philosophic science, even science today, depends on the distinction between these two types of attributes, and even if in any particular scientific investigation today the terms are not used, they are implied. In any given inquiry, there may be only partial attainment of the certainty of the nature of an attribute, yet some knowledge is better than no knowledge at all. In regard to community, the ordering of the community depends upon adequate definitions of the natures of individuals and of their measure of acquisition of the arts—definitions, that is, based on essences and not on accidents. In all the arts and sciences, knowledge is derived from the recognition of the essential attribute of a thing.

Aphorism Four

Aphorism Four gives an account of five meanings of the word "prior." "Prior" can be in "time," or "nature," or "order," or "excellence and nobility," or as "cause." Prior in time means that an entity comes first in a sequence of temporal events. For example, a runner is first in a race. Prior in nature means that an entity exists by necessity when another thing exists. For example, in mathematics, if 'two' exists, then 'one' exists, but 'one' can exist without 'two' and therefore 'one' is prior to 'two.' Prior in order is when a thing is prior in a determined sequence. For example, in a speech, the introduction is prior to the main body, not simply in time but in a purposeful sequence. Prior in excellence or nobility is when a thing is prior in a type of merit. A particular doctor may be a better doctor than another in respect to knowledge and skill. Finally, prior as cause is when two things exist together necessarily in the order of nature, but one is dependent on the other as its cause. For example, the rising of the sun and the existence of day are entities that are linked necessarily in nature and occur simultaneously, but the rising of the sun may be said to be prior because it is the cause of the existence of the day.

Let us reflect on several examples to illustrate further uses of the term and thus draw attention to the significance of the different meanings for both intellectual inquiries and

[5] Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966).

daily affairs. A thing can exist before another in time without being prior in any of the other ways of being prior. One student may finish an exam before another, and it can be said that the completion of this exam is prior to the completion of another student's exam, but this is only prior in time; a second student may finish later but produce a more excellent result in the exam, in which case it can be said that this second exam is prior, but prior in excellence. Or, with a slightly more sophisticated example, in the use of historical research methodology a scientist may consider, erroneously, that as long as a source is prior in time to another source, then the source's being prior in time is an argument for its being prior in a causal sequence, whereas in fact it would take a distinct type of argument to prove priority in cause. Or, as another example: In regard to the political community, the organization of community requires an awareness and ranking of different meanings of the term prior for particular purposes. If a ruler says a certain task is a "priority," we will need to know in what sense the term is being used. If prior in time is necessary for a particular task for the good of the community, then the ruler will need to select individuals and strategies accordingly to get the task done on time. If prior in excellence is needed for the good of the community, then the ruler will, or at least may, need to select different individuals with more competence or more effective strategies to get the task accomplished even if it takes longer. As in the previous Aphorisms, these differences in meaning of "prior" pertain to all fields of knowledge, and the Aphorism thus identifies a universal principle of logic.

Aphorism Five

Aphorism Five, the longest of the Aphorisms, identifies three types of words that are necessary for an analysis of a complete thought or judgment. These types are "name", "verb," and "instrument." The name signifies a meaning without indicating, in its essence or form, the time of the meaning. The verb signifies a meaning that exists by itself, and it also, in its essence and form, signifies the time of the meaning. The instrument signifies a meaning only when it is joined to the noun or verb or possibly joined to both at once, and it is an instrument because it depends upon the noun or verb even if it modifies the meaning of the particular noun or verb. All analysis by the rational arts is an explanation of the various relations of these three entities; those relations constitute the subjects and predicates of statements.

The combination of a subject and predicate makes "statements," usually more appropriately called "judgments," of which there are two main types: definitions and descriptions. Definitions are restrictive statements whereby an entity is identified by its essential attribute or attributes. Descriptions, in contrast, identify an entity by a non-essential—that is, an accidental—attribute or attributes; the accidental attribute may restrict in a certain way in a particular context and therefore identify a particular entity, but it will not restrict by providing a definition of the entity. Al-Fārābī gives an example of the difference between a definition and a description: if I say "a wall is an upright body made of a suitable type of material," then that is an appropriate definition of a wall; if I add "it has a door," the entire expression is a description because it is not necessary

that the wall have a door to be a wall. Definitions are the aim of science; descriptions may be useful for certain limited functions but are inexact and are not the aim of science. Thus, recognizing the nature of entities, whether these entities be natural or artificial, requires accurate definitions. In the community, the arts and sciences will depend on definitions to distinguish between competences and characters of practitioners as well as the natures of arts and materials, so that the ruler can select individuals for tasks and purposes in order that everyone will work together for a common good. All rational arts and the resulting sciences need to discover and use definitions. Even if definitions are partial or imperfect, they are better than no definition at all because they indicate at least partial knowledge of the nature of an entity. The need to distinguish definitions from descriptions is universal to all art and science.

Conclusions

Although brief, al-Fārābī's *Five Aphorisms* articulates five inquiries that are central to the whole of the arts and sciences. By choosing an aphoristic style, al-Fārābī indicates that philosophy is neither endlessly intricate nor impenetrably obscure. He affirms, in accordance with the crucial Aristotelian principle, that causation is not infinite and indeterminate—for if, as Aristotle argues, causes are infinite, there can be no causes, that is, there is no knowledge at all. The five Aphorisms can and do set a determinate and restricted trajectory of knowledge to guide the beginning student as well as the accomplished artist and scientist.

Philosophic science emerges from and reverts back to human experiences and human community, even if the philosopher is not identical with the community. Most clearly, philosophy's place is not in opposition to community, since philosophy depends on knowledge that is prescientific, though not anti-scientific. Each Aphorism has consequences for understanding the nature of philosophy and its relation to the community, which is why philosophy is understood as "human philosophy." The arts of rhetoric and poetry are for the whole community, while the arts of dialectic and demonstration are for a smaller group, sometimes even only for the inquiry of a philosopher within his or her own mind, but still with the awareness of the community.

In respect to the relation of the rational arts to the community, let me summarize just two of al-Fārābī's most pertinent arguments. First, philosophy recognizes commonly accepted meanings of words used in the language of the community, even as it requires refinement for the community's science through the identification of equivocal usages (Aphorism One). Language is at the heart of the scientific enterprise and language will need to be governed by the rational art. Secondly, what we know of as "experience," or what may also rightly and even more accurately be called "opinion," is identified through the four types of knowledge known prior to the exercise of the rational arts, articulated in Aphorism Two. These forms of experience consist in 1) authority (sometimes prophetic), 2) the opinions of the learned and wise (sometimes held unconsciously), 3) sense perception, and 4) natural knowledge. The respective sources of these means of knowledge will need to be evaluated because they are not of equal merit in any

particular situation for formulating premises in the arts and sciences. Opinions need to be judged and refined by knowledge, even if, short of complete knowledge of the whole, opinions will never completely cease to exist. Yet the community serves a vital role in the mediation of these opinions to the individual and also in assisting the individual, even the philosophical scientist, in identifying natural knowledge.

All this—the recognition of equivocal language in the rational arts and sciences, of the four types of prescientific knowledge used in science, of the difference between accident and essence in definitions, of the five meanings of prior, and of the identification of the relation of the parts of sentences of which judgments are composed—al-Fārābī enucleates for us in this short but comprehensive introduction to philosophy. In his Aphorisms, we learn of ways to gain knowledge and to be habituated in excellent judgment through these essential and universal principles of the rational arts. Like medical aphorisms to be learned, even memorized, and used by busy doctors, the five philosophic Aphorisms are intended to be mastered and to be readily available in individual minds for the study of all the arts and sciences. Despite their brevity, there is sufficient evidence in them that al-Fārābī is a contender not only for the honor of being the Second Teacher of Plato and Aristotle, but also for the exposition of the perennial definition of science itself.

Further Reading

Al-Fārābī, Abū Naṣr. *Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-Mustaʿamala fī l-Manṭiq, ḥaqaqahu wa-qaddama lahu wa-ʿallaqa ʿalayhi Muḥsin Mahdī, al-ṭabʿa al-ṯāniya*. Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq, 1968.

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Rescher, Nicholas. *Studies in the History of Arabic Philosophy*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963.

أبو نصر الفارابيّ. كتاب الألفاظ المستعمَلة في المنطق . حققه وقدّم له وعلّق عليه محسن مهدي .الطبعة الثانية .بيروت :دار المشرق 1968 .

Source Text

Bratislava MS. Bratislava 231 TE 41 ff. 5^{v4}–11^{r9} (AH 1116/1704 CE) is used as the base text for the purpose of this project because, in the current state of our knowledge, it appears to be the best recension.[6] The other two main manuscripts, Istanbul MS. Suleymaniye Hamidiye 812 ff. 3^{r17}–5^{v21} (AH 1133/1721 CE) and Paris MS. Bibliothèque nationale de France Heb. 1008 ff. 100^{r1}–103^{r10} (AH 756/1356 CE) have also been checked.[7] I have also examined several published Arabic editions. These are: D. M. Dunlop, "Al-Fārābī's Introductory Sections on Logic," *Islamic Quarterly* 2 (1955): 264–82; Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Khamsa Fuṣūl*, an Arabic edition and Turkish translation by Mübahat Türker-Küyel as part of "Fîrâbî'nin Bazi Manṭiḳ Eserleri" in *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Facültesi Dergesi* 16 (1958): 195–213; Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī*, Al-Fuṣūl al-Khamsa* in *Al-Manṭiq ʿinda al-Fārābī*, edited, introduced, and with notes by Rafīq al-ʿAjam, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1986): 63–73; Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Khamsa Fuṣūl* in *Al-Manṭiqiyyāt li-l-Fārābī*, edited and introduced by M. T. Daneche Pajuh, Maktaba Āyat Allah al-ʿAẓima al-Marʿašī al-Najafī – Holy Qom, vol. 1 (Qom: Bahman Press, AH 1408/1989 CE), 18–27. I am grateful to the staff of the Safvet Beg Bašagić Islamic manuscript collection at the University of Bratislava, Slovakia, for making a copy of Bratislava 231 TE 41 available to me and also for the permission which made it possible for me to examine the codex of this manuscript in their archives; thanks also to Nevzat Kaya, former director of the Suleymaniye collection at the University of Istanbul, who made the Istanbul MS. Suleymaniye Hamidiye 812 manuscript available; and thanks to the staff of the Bibliothèque nationale de France for providing a copy of MS. Heb. 1008. I follow Bratislava's readings except in a few places where the scribe has made an error. The changes are noted in the footnotes. For the sake of introductory clarity, I have not recorded every variant reading, but only those that are decisive. The colophon of MS. Bratislava identifies the scribe as Aḥmad ʿAlī al-Shamī, and also says that the manuscript was copied in Constantinople, that is, Istanbul.[8]

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[6] The best description of Bratislava MS. Bratislava 231 TE 41 is by Jozef Blaškovičs, *Arabische, Türkische und Persische Handschriften der Universitätsbibliothek in Bratislava* (Bratislava: Die Universitätsbibliothek in Bratislava, 1961), 181–88.

[7] The best description of Paris MS. Bnf 1008 is by Charles E. Butterworth, *Averroës' Three Short Commmentaries on Aristotle's "Topics", "Rhetoric", and "Poetics"* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 16–17.

[8] I have not been able to obtain a copy of Istanbul, MS. Topkapı Sarayı, Emanet Khazinisi (أمانت خزينه سي) 1730. Its readings are found, however, in both Türker's and al-ʿAjam's editions, although I am unable to check their trancriptions in relation to the manuscript and have not gained a consistent sense of the manuscript from their notes. The best available description of this manuscript is by al-ʿAjam: Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī*, Al-Manṭiq ʿinda al-Fārābī*, ed. Rafīq al-ʿAjam, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1986), 48–49.

The sigla are:

ب Bratislava MS. Bratislava 231 TE 41

ح Istanbul MS. Suleymaniye Hamidiye 812

ف Paris MS. Bibliothèque nationale de France Heb. 1008

[ب، 5ظ، س4] بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

فصول تشتمل على جميع ما يضطرّ إلى معرفته من أراد الشروع في صناعة المنطق وهي خمسة فصول.

الفصل الأوّل

[1] الألفاظ المُستعمَلة في كلّ صناعة منها ما ليست مشهورة عند جمهور أهل اللسان بل إنّما يُستعمَلها أهل صناعة ما فقط، مثل الانذيذج[9] والأوارج[10] في صناعة الكتابة، ومنها ما تكون مشهورة عند الجمهور غير أنّ أهل تلك الصناعة يوقعونها على معنى والجمهور على معنى آخر، مثل الزمام في صناعة الكتابة، فإنّ الكُتّاب يوقعونه على معنى والجمهور على معنى آخر. ومن هذه الألفاظ ما تكون منقولة إلى الصنائع عن المعاني الّتي تدلّ عليها عند الجمهور، إمّا لمشابهة المعاني الّتي في الصنائع للمعاني الّتي يدلّ عليها الجمهور بتلك الألفاظ، وإمّا لتعلّقها بها بوجه آخر، ومنها ما هي مشهورة عند الجمهور ويوقعها أهل تلك الصناعة على المعاني الّتي يدلّ عليها الجمهور بتلك الألفاظ.

[2] فإذا كانت المخاطبة في صناعة ما بألفاظ مشهورة عند الجمهور وكان الّذي يفهمه أهل تلك الصناعة غير ما يفهمه الجمهور منها، فليس ينبغي أن يلتفت إلى ما يعنيه الجمهور منها بل تُستعمَل على الّتي تدلّ [6و] عليها عند أهل تلك الصناعة، كما أنّ الكاتب إذا خوطب أو خاطب في صناعته بلفظ الزمام لم يعن به ما يُفهَم من زمام البعير. وكذلك نحويّو العرب متى خوطبوا أو خاطبوا بالرفع والنصب والخفض لم يلتمس منهم أن يوقعوا هذه الأسماء على المعاني الّتي يوقعها عليه من ليس بنحويّ، ولا إذا أوقع النحويّ هذه الألفاظ على غير المعاني الّتي يوقعها عليه الجمهور كان ذلك خطأ من النحويّ ولا خروجًا عن الواجب، وكذلك في سائر الصنائع.

[9] الانذيذج: [ب]، الافذيدج [ح]، אלאנדיד̈ג / الانذيذج [ف].

[10] الاوارج: [ب]، الاوارج [ح]، אלאוארג / الاوارج [ف].

الفصل الثاني

[3] الأشياء الّتي تُعلَم منها ما يُعلَم لا باستدلال ولا بفكر ولا برويّة باستنباط، ومنها ما يُعلَم بفكر ورويّة واستنباط. والّتي تُعلَم أو تُوجَد لا بفكر ولا باستدلال أصلًا أربعة أصناف: مقبولات، ومشهورات، ومحسوسات، ومعقولات أوّل. فالمقبولات هي الّتي تُقبَل عن واحد مرتضًى أو تُقَرّ[11] مرتضًى. والمشهورات هي الآراء[12] الذائعة عند جميع الناس أو عند أكثرهم أو عند علمائهم وعقلائهم أو عند أكثر هؤلاء، من غير أنّ يخالفهم فيها غيرهم ولا واحد منهم، مثل أن بِرّ الوالدين واجب، وشكر المنعم حسن وكفره قبيح، أو المشهور عند أهل كلّ صناعة أو عند المشهورين بالحذق منهم، مثل المشهور عند الأطبّاء أو الحذّاق منهم. والمحسوسات هي المدركة بإحدى الحواسّ الخمس، مثل أن زيدًا هذا جالس وأن هذا الوقت نهار. والمعقولات [6ظ] الأوّل هي الّتي نُجَد أنفسنا كأنّها فطرت على معرفتها منذ أوّل الأمر وجبلت على اليقين بها وعلى العلم بأنّها لا يجوز ولا يُمكِن غيرها أصلًا، من غير أنّ نَدري من أوّل الأمر كيف حصلت لنا هذه ولا من أين حصلت، وذلك مثل أن كلّ ثلاثة فهو عدد فرد وكلّ أربعة فهو عدد زوج، وكلّ ما هو جزء لشيء فهو أصغر من ذلك الشيء، وكلّ جملة فهي أعظم من جزئها، وكلّ مقدارين مساويين لمقدار آخر فذانك المقداران مساويان، وأشباه ذلك. وما عدا هذه الأصناف من المعلومات فإنّما نعلمه بقياس واستنباط.

الفصل الثالث

[4] الشيء قد يُوجَد في أمر ما أو به أو عنده أو له أو معه أو عنه، إمّا بالذات وإمّا بالعرض. وكونه بالذات هو أن يكون في جوهر الشيء وطِبَاعه أن يُوجَد في أمر ما أو عنده أو له أو به أو معه أو عنه، أو يكون ذلك في جوهر الأمر الّذي فيه يُوجَد الشيء أو عنده أو به أو له أو معه أو عنه، أو أن يكون ذلك في جوهريهما جميعًا. وكونه بالعرض أن لا يكون ذلك ولا في جوهر واحد منهما ولا في طباعه. فالّذي بالذات مثل الموت التابع للذبح، فإنّه يُوجَد عند الذبح بالذات، ومثل تضعيف الخمسة بالإثنين فإنّه يتبعه بالذات وجود العشرة. والّذي بالعرض هو مثل أن يبرق برق في موضع ما ويموت ههنا حيوان عند ذلك، فإنّ موافقة الموت لبرق البرق هو بالعرض لا بالذات، فإنّه ليس في طبع الموت أن يُوجَد

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[11] تُقَرّ: نفر [*sic*] [ب]، يقرّ [ح]، בקד / بقد [ف].

[12] الآراء: الارآء [ب]، الاراء [ح]، אלארא / الأراء [ف].

عند البرق ولا ذلك في طباع البرق، وهذه هي حالة جميع ما يُوجَد [7و] اتّفاقًا. والّذي بالذات يُوجَد إمّا دائما وإمّا في أكثر الأمر، فالدائم مثل تضعيف الخمسة بالعشرة الّذي يتبعه دائمًا وجود الخمسين، والّذي في الأكثر مثل وجود الشيب للإنسان عند الشيخوخة وكون البرد في الشيتاء وأشباه ذلك.

الفصل الرابع

[5] يُقال إنّ شيئًا يتقدّم شيئًا آخر على خمسة أنحاء: إمّا بالزمان، وإمّا بالطبع، وإمّا بالمرتبة، وإمّا بالفضل والشرف والكمال، وإمّا بأنّه سبب وجود الشيء. فالمتقدّم بالزمان إمّا في الماضي فما كان زمانه أبعد من الآن، والمتأخّر ما كان زمانه أقرب إلى الآن، وإمّا في المستقبل فإنّ المتقدّم ما كان زمانه أقرب الى الأن، والمتأخّر ما كان زمانه أبعد من الآن. والمتقدّم بالطبع يُوجَد إضطرارًا إذا وُجِد الشيء الآخر ولا يرتفع بارتفاع ذلك الشيء، وإذا ارتفع هو ارتفع ذلك الشيء الآخر ضرورة. وإذا وُجِد لم يلزم ضرورة أنْ يُوجَد ذلك الشيء الآخر، مثل الواحد والإثنين فإنّ الواحد متقدّم بالطبع للإثنين ويُوجَد ضرورة بوجود الإثنين ولا يرتفع بارتفاع الإثنين. وإذا ارتفع الواحد ارتفع الإثنان ضرورة، وإذا وُجِد الواحد لم يلزم ضرورة وجود الإثنين. وكذلك الحيوان والإنسان، فالإنسان إذا وُجِد وُجِد الحيوان ضرورة وإذا ارتفع لم يرتفع الحيوان، والحيوان إذا ارتفع ارتفع الإنسان وإذا وُجِد لم يلزم ضرورة وجود الإنسان، فالحيوان متقدّم بالطبع للإنسان.

[6] والمتقدّم في المرتبة هو الأقرب إلى مبدإٍ ما محدود إمّا [7ظ] في مكان وإمّا في غيره ممّا له ترتيب، مثل ما يُقال إنّ صدر القول والكتاب متقدّم للاقتصاص في المرتبة، وزيد متقدّم عند الملك في المجلس. والمتقدّم في الفضل والكمال، مثل ما يُقال في طبيبين أحدهما أكمل من الآخر في الطبّ إنّ الأكمل منها هو المتقدّم في الطبّ، وكذلك فيما نوعَهما مختلفان إذا كان أحدهما أشرف من الآخر، مثل الحكمة وصناعة الرقص فإنّ الحكيم متقدّم في الشرف على الرقّاص. والمتقدّم بأنّه سبب هو السبب من الشيئين اللّذين يتكافآن في لزوم الوجود، مثل طلوع الشمس ووجود النهار، فإنّه إذا وُجِد النهار لزم ضرورة أنْ تكون الشمس قد طلعت وإنّ طلعت الشمس لزم ضروري أنْ يُوجَد النهار. فهما يتكافآن في لزوم الوجود غير أنّ طلوع الشمس هو السبب في وجود النهار، وليس وجود النهار سببًا لطلوع الشمس، فطلوع الشمس، فطلوع الشمس يُقال إنّه متقدّم لوجود النهار بما إنّه سبب لا

غير. ولا يمتنع أنْ تكون ههنا أسباب تتقدّم بالزمان الشيء الكائن عنها، مثل البَنّاء والحائط فإنّه يجمع التقدّم بوجهين بإنّه سبب وبالزمان. وقد لا يمتنع في الشيء الواحد أنْ يكون متقدّمًا بجميع هذه الوجوه أو بأكثرها. وقد لا يمتنع أيضًا أنْ يكون الشيء الواحد متقدّمًا لشيء ما بوجه ومتأخّرًا عنه بوجهٍ آخر، مثل أن يكون طبيبان أحدهما مسنّ والآخر حدث وأحذقهما أحدثهما سنًّا، فإنّ الحدث هو متأخّر في الزمان ومتقدّم على الآخر في الفضل.

الفصل الخامس

[7] الألفاظ الدالّة [8و] منها المفردة ومنها المُركّبة غير المفردة. فالمفردة ثلاثة أصناف، إسم، وكلمة، وأداة. فالكلمة هي الّتي يعرفها أهل صناعة النحو من العرب بالفعل والأداة يسمّونها الحرف الّذي جاء لمعنى.

[8] والإسم لفظة مفردة دالّة على معنى يُمكِن أن يُفهَم وحده وبنفسه من غير أنّ يدلّ بذاته وبنيته وشكله على زمان ذلك المعنى. وذلك مثل قولك حيوان وإنسان وزيد وعمرو وبياض وسواد، فإنّ كلّ واحدة من هذه الألفاظ لفظة مفردة دالّة على معنى يُمكِن أن يُفهَم ويُتصوَّر وحده وبنفسه، وليس واحد من هذه يدلّ بذاته وشكله على زمان المعنى الّذي يدلّ عليه. والكلمة لفظة مفردة دالّة على معنى يُمكِن أن يُفهَم وحده وبنفسه وتدلّ مع ذلك ببنيتها وبذاتها على زمان ذلك المعنى الّذي فيه وجوده. وذلك مثل قولك مشي ويمشي وسيمشي، فإنّ هذه كلّها تدلّ على معنى وتدلّ مع ذلك بأشكالها وبذواتها على الأزمنة الّتي فيها وجود ذلك المعنى، وذلك بالذات لا بالعرض. والأداة لفظة مفردة تدلّ على معنى لا يُمكِن أنْ يُفهَم وحده وبذاته، بل إنّما يُفهَم إذا قُرِن بإسم أو بكلمة أو بهما جميعًا، مثل قولنا من وعلى وأشباه هذه الألفاظ.

[9] فالإسم والكلمة يَتميَّزان من الأداة بما أُسْتُثنِي في تحديدهما من إنّهما يَدلّان على معنى يُمكِن أنْ يُعقَل وحده من غير حاجة إلى أنْ يُقرَن بشيء آخر. والإسم يَتميَّز عن الكلمة بأن الإسم يدلّ على المعنى من غير أنّ يدلّ [8ظ] على الزمان الّذي فيه وجوده بذاته وبنيته، والكلمة تدلّ على المعنى وعلى الزمان الّذي فيه وجود المعنى ببنيتها وبذاتها، فإنّها تدلّ على شيئين، على المعنى وعلى زمانه. ولهذا السبب لم يكن قولنا أمس وغدًا واليوم كلمًا، من قِبَل أنْ كلّ واحدة من هذه تدلّ من أوّل أمرها على زمان من غير أنّ تدلّ على معنى في ذلك الزمان، فإنّ المعنى الّذي يدلّ عليه كلّ واحدة من هذه الألفاظ هو زمان ما

وهى دلالته الأُولى، مثل دلالة قولنا حيوان على المعنى الّذي يدلّ عليه أوّلاً، وهو الجسم الحسّاس. وكذلك السنة والشهر والساعة، فإنّ هذه كلّها أسماء وليست بكلم. إذ كانت لا تدلّ على أزمنة المعاني الّتي[13] عليها أوّلاً، لأنّها لو كانت كذلك لدلّت على أزمنة الزمان، وذلك مُحال وغير موجود في هذه الألفاظ.

[10] وإنّما أُستُثنِيَ في تحديد الإسم أن لا يدلّ بذاته على زمان، من قِبَل أنْ قولنا المشي والحركة وبالجملة الأفعال كلّها، لمّا كانت تُوجَد في زمان، ظنّ بالألفاظ الّتي تدلّ عليها إنّها تدلّ على أزمنتها أيضًا، وليست كذلك. بل إنّما تدلّ عليها وهو مقترنة بزمان، واللفظة منها إنّما تدلّ ببنيتها على المعنى من غير أنّ تدلّ بشكلها على الزمان المقترنة به، وذلك بالذات. فأمّا بالعرض فإنّها تدلّ على زمانه كما أنّ لفظة البياض تدلّ على معنى مقترن بجسم لا ينفكّ منه، وليست تدلّ بنفس بنيتها على الجسم الّذي لا ينفكّ منه البياض وكذلك المشي والحركة، وإنّ كانت تدلّ على معانٍ شأنها أن الانتفاء من زمان، فليست بذواتها تدلّ [9و] على الزمان.

[11] والكلمة مع دلالتها على زمان المعنى قد تدلّ أيضًا على الموضوع الّذي فيه المعنى دلالةً مجملةً، فكأنّها تدلّ على الموضوع الّذي شأنه أن يقترن به المعنى. وذلك مثل قولنا يمشي، فإنّه يدلّ على مشي وزمان فيه المشي وعلى الشيء الّذي فيه المشي، من غير أنّ يصرّح بإسمه الّذي يخصّه. وتشارك الكلمة في هذا الأمر الأسماء الّتي تدلّ أشكالها على موضوعات معانيها، مثل قولنا الأبيض والأسود والضارب والمتحرّك والشجاع والفصيح، فإنّ كلّ واحد من هذه يدلّ دلالةً مجملةً على موضوعاتها. فإنّ البياض إنّما قد يدلّ على المعنى الّذي يدلّ عليه مجرّدًا دون الموضوع، وكذلك الشجاعة والفصاحة. فأمّا الأبيص والشجاع والفصيح فإنّها تدلّ على البياض وعلى الشجاعة والفصاحة وعلى الموضوعات الّتي فيها تُوجَد هذه. فلذلك لا يمتنع أن يظنّ بهذه أنّها داخلة في الكلم، وخاصّةً ما كان من هذه الأسماء مشتقًّا من الأفعال والحركات الّتي شأنها أن تقترن بالأزمان وهي الّتي إذا فهمت انجرّت الأزمان معها في الذهن، مثل قولنا ماش وضارب وآكل وشارب، وأشباه هذه. فلذلك ظنّ كثير من القدماء بهذه الألفاظ أنّها كلم لا أسماء، من قِبَل أنّها تدلّ بذواتها على الموضوعات الّتي فيها تُوجَد هذه، وتدلّ بالعرض على زمان المعنى، فإنّها لمّا كانت معانيها

[13] missing [ب]، تدلّ [ح]، תדל / تدلّ [ف].

إذا عقلت وفهمت انجرّ معها الزمان في فهمنا ظنّ بها أنّها تدلّ على زمان، وليست كذلك، بل إنّ كان بدّ فبالعرض.

[12] والكلم [9ظ] منها الكلم الوجوديّة ومنها ما ليست بوجوديّة. والوجوديّة هي مثل كان ويكون ووُجِد ويُوجَد وصار ويصير وما جرى مجرى هذه وأُسْتُعمَل مكان هذه، فإنّه ربّما أُستُعمَل مكان هذه أصبح وأمسى وظلّ وأشباه هذه. وما قام مقامها تَسَمَّى الكلم الوجوديّة، من قِبَل أنّها تُستعمَل في الدلالة على وجود شيء لشيء آخر وعلى ارتباط الخبر بالمخبر عنه، مثل قولنا زيد يُوجَد ذاهبًا إذا كان ذاهبًا، وزيد صار عالمًا. وهذه ربّما أُستُعمَلت دلالاتٍ على ارتباط الخبر بالمخبر عنه، وربّما أُستُعمَل كلّ واحد منها خبرًا بنفسه، مثل قولنا زيد كان، وزيد وُجِد، إذا أردنا به حصل موجودًا أو حصل مخلوقًا. وإنّما أُستُعمَل هذه الكلمات الوجوديّة روابط متى كان الخبر والمخبر عنه جميعًا إسمين، وأردنا أن ندلّ على الأزمنة الثلاثة، مثل قولنا زيد كان فصيحًا زيد يكون فصيحًا زيد فصيحٌ. وقد جرت عادة العرب أن لا تُستعمَل الكلمة الوجوديّة في الزمان الحاضر مصرّحا بها لكن يضمّرونها، مثل قولنا زيد فصيحٌ، فإنّهم يضمّرون بينهما ما يدلّ عندهم على لفظ هو فصيحٌ، فتكون الكلمة الوجوديّة أو الّتي تقوم مقام الكلمة الوجوديّة المُستعمَلة في الزمان الحاضر هذه اللفظة.

[13] خاصّة الإسم إنّه قد يكون مخبرًا عنه وقد يكون خبرًا بنفسه من غير حاجة إلى أن يُقرَن بشيء آخر، مثل قولنا زيد إنسان، فإنّ الخبر والمخبر عنه إسم. وأمّا الكلمة فإنّها تكون خبرًا بنفسها وحدها من غير حاجة بها إلى أن تُقرَن بشيء آخر، ولا يُمكِن أن تكون [10و] مخبرًا عنها أو تُقرَن بصلة، فإنّه لا يُمكِن أن تقول يمشي هو كذا وكذا دون أن تقول الّذي يمشي هو الإنسان فتُقرَن يمشي بقولك الّذي. وتقول زيد يمشي من غير أنّ تقرن يمشي، وهي خبر، بصلة ولا غيرها، على أنّ كثيرًا من القدماء يرون أن الإسم خاصّته أن يكون مخبرًا عنه بذاته، ولا يكون خبرًا أو يُقرَن بكلمة وجوديّة إمّا بتصريح وإمّا بإضمار. وخاصّة الكلمة إنّها تكون خبرًا بذاتها ونفسها، ولا تكون مخبرًا عنها إلّا بصلة تُقرَن بها. وذلك أنّهم يرون أن قولنا زيد إنسان ليس يكون الإنسان فيه خبرًا ما لم يُصرَّح فيه أو تُضمَّر فيه لفظة هو أو ما يقوم مقامها. فيكون الإنسان إنّما صار خبرًا عندهم حين قُرِن بهو فقيل هو إنسان أو كان إنسانًا أو وُجِد إنسانًا.

[14] وخاصّة الأداة أنّها لا تكون خبرًا ولا مخبرًا عنها، مثل قولنا هل ولم ومن، لكن ربّما كان كثير منها جزءًا لخبرٍ أو مخبرٍ عنه، مثل قولنا زيد كان في البيت، فإنّ زيدًا هو المخبر عنه والخبر قولنا في البيت، وقولنا كان كلمة وجوديّة ربطت الخبر بالمخبَر عنه ودلّت على زمان وجود الخبر.

[15] ومن خواصّ الكلمة أنّها إذا كانت خبرًا لم تحتج إلى شيء آخر يربطها بالمخبر عنه، بل هي رابطة ذاتها بالمخبر عنه مثل قولنا زيد يمشي. وأصحاب المنطق يسمّون المخبر عنه الموضوع ويسمّون الخبر المحمول.

[16] والألفاظ المُركّبة تُتركَّب عن هذه الأجناس الثلاثة إمّا عن جميعها وإمّا عن إثنين منها. وأصناف الألفاظ المُركّبة الأوّل صنفان، أحدهما ما تركبه تركب[14] إخبار والآخر ما تركيبه [10ظ] تركيب اشتراط وإستِثناء وتقييد. فالّذي تركيبه تركيب إخبار كقولنا زيد إنسان وعمرو ذاهب والإنسان حيوان، والّذي في تركيبه تركيب اشتراط مثل قولنا زيد الكاتب والإنسان الأبيض وصديقُ زيدٍ وأمثال هذه. والمُركّب منه ما يدلّ كلّ جزء منه على جزء من المعنى وجملته على جملة المعنى، ومنه ما تدلّ جملته على جملة المعنى ولا يدلّ جزؤه على جزء المعنى، مثل قولنا قيس عيلان وعبد شمس وأمثال هذه، فإنّها تدلّ على شخص ما، وجزؤه، وهو عبد أو شمس، ليس يدلّ على جزء من جملة الشخص، والّذي تدلّ جملته على جملة معنى وجزؤه على جزء ذلك المعنى فهو مثل قولنا مؤثّر الحِكمةِ وصديقُ زيدٍ والإنسان الأبيض، فما كان من المُركّبات لا يدلّ جزؤه على جزء الجملة فإنّه يجرى مجرًى الألفاظ المفردة. وما كان جزؤه يدلّ على جزء من الجملة فإنّ أصحاب المنطق يسمّونه القول كان تركيبه تركيب تقييد أو تركيب إخبار، وما كان تركيبه تركيب إخبار فإنّ أصحاب المنطق يسمّونه القول الجازم، ويسمّونه القضية، ويسمّونه الحكم، وذلك مثل قولنا زيد يمشي والإنسان حيوان.

[17] والحدّ قولٌ تركيبه تركيب تقييد يشرح المعنى المدلول عليه بإسم ما بالأشياء الّتي بها قوام ذلك المعنى. والرسم إنّما هو قولٌ تركيبه تركيب تقييد يشرح المعنى المدلول عليه بإسم ما بالأشياء الّتي ليس بها قوام ذلك المعنى، بل بأحواله أو بالأشياء الّتي قوامها بذلك المعنى. مثال ذلك الحائط فإنّه إسم يدلّ على معنى قد يُمكِن أن نشرح بقولين،[11و]

[14] تركبه تركب: [ب]، تركيبه تركيب [ح]، תרכיבה תרכיב / تركيبه تركيب [ف].

أحدهما إنّه جسم منتصب معمول من حجارة أو لبن أو طين ليحمل السقف، والقول الثاني إنّه جسم تُعلَّق عليه الأبواب وتوتد فيه الأوتاد ويجصّص وتعمل له شرفات ويستند إليه الجالس. فالقول الأوّل شرح معنى إسم الحائط بالأشياء الّتي بها قوامه، والثاني شرحه بالأشياء الّتي ليس بها قوامه، فإنّ الحائط ليس تُنقَص ذاته بألّا يُعلَّق عليه باب أو ألّا تجصّص أو ألّا يكون له شرفات أو ألّا يستند إليه، وإذا لم يكن لبن ولا حجارة ولا طين فإنّه لا يكون لحائط وجود. فالقول الأوّل هو حدّ الحائط والثاني رسمه، وكذلك يجرى الأمر في سائر الأشياء.

[18] [11و، س9] تَمّت الفصول في التوطئة والحمد لله حقّ حمده.

Summary and Translation

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Summary of the Five Aphorisms

Invocation and Title

A. The First Aphorism (paras. 1 and 2)
    1. The utterances used in arts are sometimes not known to the public and at other times are known (para. 1).
    2. The people of the rational arts need to be aware of the usage of utterances by the public, but it is appropriate for the people of the rational arts to use the utterances in specific ways which are necessary for their philosophic sciences (para. 2).
B. The Second Aphorism (para. 3)
    1. Four types of knowing without the use of the arts of deliberation and proof: received opinions, generally accepted opinions, sense perceptions, and first intelligibles.

[15] The first English translation was made by D. M. Dunlop, "Al-Fārābī's Introductory Sections on Logic," *Islamic Quarterly* 2 (1955): 264–82. Although there are a number of places in which I have sought to improve on Dunlop's translation, for example by using 'verb' instead of 'vocable' in the Fifth Aphorism, I remain indebted to his translation. Dunlop's main manuscript was Istanbul MS. Hamidiye 812 and he did not have access, as far as I know, to Bratislava MS. Bratislava 231 TE 41.

C. The Third Aphorism (para. 4)
    1. The ways in which things are related to one another, either essentially or accidentally.
D. The Fourth Aphorism (paras. 5 and 6)
    1. Five types of "prior," in time, nature, order, perfection, and cause. Prior in time and nature (para. 5).
    2. Prior in order, excellence, and cause (para. 6).
E. The Fifth Aphorism (paras. 7–18)
    1. Two types of utterances, simple and combined (para. 7).
    2. Definitions of three simple utterances, name, verb, and instrument (para. 8).
    3. Names and verbs are distinguished from instruments because they have a meaning alone and in their essences, and do not, like instruments, need to be joined with names or verbs (para. 9).
    4. Names, even though some may appear to signify time, do not in their essence do so (para. 10).
    5. Verbs signify the meaning, the time of the meaning, and the general signification of the subject; names, too, signify the subject with a general signification, and even though the names are sometimes thought to signify times as well as meanings, as many of the ancients thought, they do not signify times (para. 11).
    6. The distinction between existential and non-existential verbs and an explanation of existential verbs (para. 12).
    7. A specific property of the name is that it may be both a subject of the attribute and an attribute alone and in its essence, that is, it does not need to be joined with anything else. A specific property of the verb is that it is an attribute alone and in its essence, and it cannot be a subject of the attribute unless it is joined to a relative pronoun (para. 13).
    8. A specific property of the instrument is that it is neither a subject of the attribute nor an attribute unless it is joined with something else (para. 14).
    9. Among the specific properties of the verb is that because it is an attribute, it does not need anything else to connect it with the subject of attribution (para. 15).
    10. The two types of composed, restrictive utterances which are necessary, according to the logicians, for the creation of primary composed utterances are called the "declarative" and the "restrictive" utterances. When the declaration is made through composition, or the restrictive is combined with a predicate to form a whole, these utterances form what the logicians call the "decisive statement" or "judgment" (para. 16).
    11. The definitions of "definition" and "description" and their distinction (para. 17).

The end of the aphorisms (para. 18).

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Aphorisms Comprising Everything of which We Need to be Cognizant to Begin the Study of the Art of Logic;

There Are Five Aphorisms

Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī

The First Aphorism

[1] Of the utterances[16] which are used in every art, some of them are not generally known amongst the public of the people of the language, but rather the practitioners of the art alone use them, for example 'the account' and 'the record' in the art of the scribe.[17] Others of them are generally known amongst the public, except that the practitioners of this art apply to them one meaning and the public another meaning;

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[16] I have translated *lafẓ* (لفظ, singular) and *alfāẓ* (ألفاظ, plural), as well as *lafẓa* and *lafaẓāt*, as 'utterance' and 'utterances' respectively because al-Fārābī uses *lafẓ* in place of Aristotle's Greek word *phōnē* (ἡ φωνή). Al-Fārābī promulgates Aristotle's analysis that written marks are symbols of spoken sounds, which are in turn symbols of the affections of the soul (Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 16a1–9), that is, written marks are imitations of the imitations of affections of the soul. Thus, al-Fārābī preserves Aristotle's primacy of speech. On this primacy of the spoken, Aristotle and al-Fārābī are, in turn, faithful students of Plato's *Phaedrus*. See Plato, *Phaedrus*, trans. James H. Nichols Jr. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). The importance of speech is a theme central to the entire treatise, but see especially Socrates's speech in 274c–275b.

[17] The English translation cannot adequately communicate the sense of the terms 'the account' (*al-indhīdhaj*) and 'the record' (*al-awārij*) used here, nor for that matter are they generally understood in Arabic. Al-Fārābī's purpose is to indicate that the words are rare or unknown to the Arabic-speaking public but are used in a precise way by the practitioners of the art of the scribe. There is uncertainty as to their origin or roots. According to the scribe Ezra ben Rabbi Shlomo ben Gratnia (or Gatnin) of Saragossa, in his expanded commentary on the passage in Paris MS. Bibliothèque nationale de France Heb. 1008, they are both Persian words, which would explain their unfamiliarity to common Arabic speakers even though their usage is understood by those educated in the art. See Dunlop, "Introductory Sections," 266. A modern Persian scholar, Mustafa Dehqan, informs me that neither term is Persian, but also says اوارج and اوارجه are used today for notebooks for keeping numbers and statistics and that these two forms are, *muʿarrab*, that is, Arabized forms in Persian, though it is not certain they are originally Arabic. Neither *al-indhīdhaj* nor *al-awārij* are entries in Hans Wehr's *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Arabic-English)*, ed. J. M. Cowan, 4th ed. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1979), or in William Edward Lane's *An Arabic-English Lexicon* (Beirut: Librarie du Liban, 1968). The spelling of the two terms varies between the manuscripts; al-ʿAjam has *al-andhidhaj* instead of *al-indhidhaj* (al-Fārābī, *Al-Manṭiq ʿinda al-Fārābī*, ed. al-ʿAjam, vol. 1, 63). The vocalization I have suggested remains uncertain. None the less, al-Fārābī's point is clear. The terms are unfamiliar to the public but known to the practitioners of the scribal art.

an example is 'the bridle' in the art of the scribe because the scribes apply to it [that is, the utterance] a meaning and the public apply to it another. Among these utterances are those which are transferred to the arts from the signification of the meanings which are used by the public, either because of the similarity of the meanings which are in the arts to the meanings which the public signifies with these utterances or because of their connection with them in another way. Still other utterances are generally known amongst the public, and the practitioners of the arts apply to them the meanings which the public signifies by these utterances.

[2] If the discourse in a particular art is according to the utterances which are generally known to the public, and the people of the art understand them in a way which is different from the way the public understands them, it is unnecessary to attend to what the public means by them. Rather, they are used according to the way in which they are signified by the people of this art, even as the scribe, when he hears or speaks the utterance 'bridle' in his art, he does not mean by it what is understood by the 'bridle' of the camel. Likewise, the grammarians of the Arabs, when they hear or speak about the 'raising' or the 'elevation' or the 'depression,'[18] it is not required of them to apply to these names the meanings which are applied to them by one who is not a grammarian, even if the grammarian applies these utterances to different meanings than those used by the public. This is not an error on the part of the grammarian and is not a departure from what is proper. This is similar for the rest of the arts.

The Second Aphorism

[3] Of the things which are known, some are known without proof, or thought, or reflection, or deduction and some are known by thought and reflection and deduction. Of the things which are known and exist without any thought and proof whatsoever, there are four types: received opinions, generally accepted opinions, sense perceptions, and first intelligibles. Received opinions are those which are received from a single chosen one or which are determined by a chosen one. The things generally accepted are opinions which are spread abroad amongst all the people, or amongst most of them, or amongst the learned and intelligent among them, or most of them without any others, not even one of them, contradicting them: for example, kindness to parents is a duty and gratitude to a benefactor is good and ingratitude is bad; or what is generally known according to the people of every art or to those of them celebrated for their skill, for example, what is generally known to doctors or the doctors who are skilled. Sense perceptions are the things apprehended by one of the five senses, for example, that Zaid is sitting here or that this is daytime. The first intelligibles are the things we find in ourselves, our cognizance of them is formed from the first, and certainty concerning knowledge is created because of them; it is not permissible nor possible for them to be otherwise in any way, and we are not aware from the first how these came to us and

[18] These are the English translations of the names of the three classes of Arabic vowels, the *ḍamma,* 'raising,' *fatḥa*, 'elevation,' and the *kasra*, 'depression.' For the identification of the scribe, see Butterworth, *Averroës' Three Short Commentaries*, 16 and 97–98n42.

from where they came. These are examples; that every three is an odd number and every four is an even number, that every part of a thing is smaller than that thing and every whole is greater than its parts, that every two quantities which are equal to another quantity are equal to one another, and the like. Apart from these types of knowledge, what we know is by syllogism and deduction.

The Third Aphorism

[4] A thing may exist 'in' another particular thing or 'by' it or 'at' it or 'for' it or 'with' it or 'from' it, either essentially or accidentally. Its being essential is that it is in the essence of a thing and its nature that the thing exists 'in' another particular thing or 'at' it or 'for' it or 'by' it or 'with' it or 'from' it, or it is in the essence of the [second] thing 'in' which the [first] thing exists, or [for the first thing to be] 'from' it or 'in' it or 'to' it or 'with' it or 'from' it, or it is in both of them together. Its being accidental is that it is not in the essence of one of the two of them [to be in such a relation] and it is not in its nature. Of that which is the essence, for example, is death which follows throat-cutting, for it [death] indeed exists in essence at the throat-cutting. Another example is the multiplication of five by two, because the existence of ten follows essentially. An example of what is accidental is that lightning strikes in a certain place and an animal dies at this place. The coincidence of the death with the striking of lightning is by accident and is not by essence because it is not in the nature of death that it exists at the lightning, and it is not in the nature of lightning [that death exists]. This is the case of everything which exists by coincidence. That which exists by essence is either constant or for most things. An example of the constant is the multiplying of five by ten, which leads constantly to the existence of fifty. An example of that which exists for the most part is hoariness in men of old age and cold in winter and the like.

The Fourth Aphorism

(5) It is said that a thing is prior to another thing in five ways: either 1) in time, or 2) nature or 3) order or 4) excellence or nobility or perfection or 5) as a cause of the existence of a thing. The prior in 'time' in the past is either the time furthest from now or posterior to that which is nearest to now, or in the future it is prior if it is time nearest to now and posterior if it is time furthest from now. The prior by 'nature' exists of necessity when another thing exists, and it is not eliminated when this second thing is eliminated; when it is eliminated, the other thing is necessarily eliminated, but when it exists it does not necessarily follow that the other thing exists. An example is one and two. One is prior by nature to two and it exists by necessity with the existence of two and it is not eliminated when two is eliminated. But if one is eliminated, two is eliminated necessarily. And when one exists it is not necessary that two exists. Similarly, with animal and man, for when man exists, animal exists by necessity and when he is eliminated, animal is not eliminated. But when animal is removed it removes man, but when animal is removed, man is removed by necessity. So, animal is prior by nature to man.

[6] Prior in 'order' is that which is nearest to a specific principle, either in place or in any other way that has an order. For example, it is said that the commencement of a speech or of a book is prior to the main narrative in order, and that Zaid is prior in the presence of the king in the council. Prior in 'excellence' and 'perfection' are when, for example, it is said of two doctors that one of them is more competent than the other in medicine and the competent one is prior to the second in medicine. Similarly, in two species of things which are different, the one is more noble than the other. Similarly, with wisdom and the art of dancing, the wise man is prior in nobility to the dancer. The prior in 'cause' is the cause from amongst the two causes of a thing which are equivalent in necessary cause of being, as for example the rising of the sun and the existence of the day. And if the day exists, the sun arose, and the rising of the sun is connected by necessity to the existence of the day. Thus, the two are equivalent in the necessary connection of existence except that the rising of the sun is cause of the existence of the day and not otherwise, and there is no existence of day that is a cause of the rising of the sun. Thus, the rising of the sun is said to be prior to the existence of the day in that it is a cause, not otherwise. It is not impossible that there are causes which are prior in time to the thing which proceeds from them, as for example, the builder and the wall, for the prior unites in two ways, in cause and in time; nor is it impossible that one thing should be prior in all these ways or most of them; nor again is it impossible that a thing be prior to a specific thing in one way and posterior to it in another way. For example, there are two doctors, one of them is old and the other is young, and the young is more skillful than the old, even though the young is posterior in time but prior to the other in excellence.

The Fifth Aphorism

[7] Of the utterances which signify, some of them are simple and some of them are composite, not simple. The simple utterances are of three types: 'name' (*ism*), 'verb' [*kalima*], and 'instrument' [*adā*]. The 'verb' [*kalima*] is that which the Arab grammarians cognize as 'verb' [*fiʿl*] and the 'instrument' [*adā*] they call the 'particle' [*ḥarf*], which is a part of a meaning. [19]

[19] Al-Fārābī deliberately selects Arabic terms for 'verb' and 'instrument' which are different from those used by the grammarians. For 'verb' he uses *kalima* instead of *fiʿl*, and for 'instrument' he uses *adā* instead of *ḥarf*, 'particle.' In these selections, al-Fārābī judges that the art of logic should deliberately use at least some terms which are different from the generally accepted usage of the public and also of the grammarians. In English, unfortunately, the term 'verb' does not show how his selection serves to distinguish the terms used in the art of logic by using a word that is distinct from the common and grammatical usage. There is no suitable alternative in English for 'verb' as there is in Arabic, and readers must depend upon a note like this for the explanation of the logical usage. Dunlop uses the word 'vocable,' an attempt to find a different English term than 'verb'; however, 'vocable' in English refers to what can be sounded, such as the syllable 'la' in a musical scale but does not indicate a class of terms signifying both the meaning and the time of the meaning. Dunlop, "Introductory Sections," 278 *et passim*. The limitation in English is not

[8] The ‘name’ is a simple utterance which signifies a meaning which can be understood alone and by itself, and it does not signify in its essence, its form, and its structure the time of the meaning, as for example when you say ‘animal,’ and ‘man,’ and ‘Zaid,’ and ‘‘Amr,’ and ‘white,’ and ‘black.’ Each of these utterances is simple which signifies a meaning which can be understood and conceived alone and by itself. Not one of these utterances signifies by its essence and its form the time of the meaning which it signifies. The ‘verb’ is a simple utterance which signifies a meaning which can be understood alone and by itself, and it signifies along with this, by its form and essence, the time at which the meaning exists, when you say, for example, ‘he walked,’ ‘he walks,’ ‘he will walk,’ all of which signify a meaning and they signify along with this, in their forms and their essences, the times at which this meaning exists—and this [nature of the verb] is in essence, not in accident. The ‘instrument’ is a simple utterance which signifies a meaning which cannot be understood alone and by its essence but is understood when it is joined to a ‘name’ or a ‘verb’ or both of them together, as for example when we say ‘from,’ or ‘on,’ or utterances which resemble these.

[9] The ‘name’ and the ‘verb’ are distinguished from the ‘instrument’ by what is specified in their definitions, namely, that they both signify a meaning which can be intellected alone without the need of being joined with another thing. The ‘name’ is distinguished from the ‘verb’ in that the ‘name’ signifies the meaning without signifying by means of its essence and its form the time of its existence. The ‘verb’ signifies the meaning and the time in which the meaning exists in its form and in its essence; therefore, it [the verb] signifies two things, the meaning and its time. For this reason, we say, ‘yesterday,’ ‘tomorrow,’ and ‘today’ are not verbs, because each one of these signifies in the first place the time without signifying the meaning of the time. The meaning of each one of these utterances is a particular time which is its first signification, as for example when we say that the signification of an ‘animal’ is the meaning which it first signifies, that is, that it is a sentient body. Similarly with ‘year,’ and ‘month,’ and ‘hour,’ all of them are names not verbs because they do not signify the times of the meanings which are their primary significations. If they did, they would signify the times of the time, but that is impossible and there is no existence in these utterances.

[10] Specifically, there is an exclusion in the definition of the name because [the name] does not indicate time in its essence; this is so even when we say ‘walking’ or ‘moving.’ In general all actions, since they exist in a time, the utterances which signify them are thought to signify their times also, but this is not so. Rather, they signify the times only when they are joined to a time. Such utterances by their utterances themselves signify the meanings without signifying the times connected with them, that is, in their essences. As for what is by accident, however, these utterances signify time

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the case for the Arabic term *ism*, which is equivocal and means both ‘name’ and ‘noun.’ Thus, the translation of *ism* as ‘name’ is deliberately distinct from the usage of the grammarians, when the term is used in the sense of ‘noun.’

just as the utterance 'whiteness' signifies a meaning connected with the body from which it is inseparable but does not signify in itself by its form the actual body from which the 'whiteness' is inseparable. Similarly, 'walking' and 'moving' signify meanings that are inseparable from time, but their essences do not signify time.

[11] The verb, as well as signifying the time of the meaning, may also signify, by a general signification, the subject in which the meaning exists, so that it signifies the subject which is such that the meaning is connected with it. For example, we say 'he walks,' which signifies the walking, the time of it, and the thing which is walking, without making explicit the name which it particularizes. The verb shares this characteristic [of signifying the subject with a general signification] with the names whose forms signify the subjects of their meanings. For example, we say 'the white,' 'the black,' 'the striking,' 'the moving,' 'the courageous,' and 'the eloquent,' and each one of these signifies its subjects with a general signification.[20] For 'whiteness' may signify the meaning which it signifies, purely, without its subject, and similarly 'courage' and 'eloquence.'[21] Yet 'the white' and 'the courageous' and 'the eloquent' signify 'whiteness' and 'courage' and 'eloquence' and the subjects in which they exist. On account of this [general signification of the subject by both the verbs and the names], it is not impossible to suppose that it [the name] enters into [the nature of] the verbs, and especially of those names which are derived from the actions and motions which are such that they are joined with times. And these [names which are derived from actions] are those in which, when they are understood, the times occur with them in the mind, as for example when we say 'the walker,' or 'the striker,' or 'the eater,' or 'the drinker,' and things resembling these. For this reason, many of the ancients supposed that these utterances are verbs, not names, because they signify in their essences the subjects in which they exist and signify accidentally the time of the meaning. For if their meanings are intellected and understood, time occurs with them in our understanding and it is supposed that they signify time, but they do not. If it [that is, if their link with the signification of time] must be so, then it [that is, such a link of time with the name] is by accident.

[12] The verbs are either existential or non-existential. The existential ones are, for example, 'he was' and 'he is' and 'he existed' and 'he exists' and 'he became' and 'he becomes' and what resembles these or what is used in place of them because often such utterances as 'he was in the morning' and 'he was in the evening' and 'he was

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[20] The definite article, which is used in Arabic in each of the examples, is used in each case with either a common noun or a verbal noun (a *maṣdar*). In these instances, the article adds a measure of specificity and therefore signifies the subject with a general signification but not as an abstract name. The definite article in English also transforms a potentially abstract noun into a particular subject, even if it is a general specification; 'whiteness' becomes 'the whiteness [of something].'

[21] The three Arabic words here which are translated as 'whiteness,' 'courage,' and 'eloquence' are the abstract forms of the nouns even though in Arabic in these instances the definite article is used with each. At least one of the ways which Arabic creates abstract nouns is through a change in spelling so they are identifiable with or without the definite article.

[maintained] during the whole day' are used in their places.[22] What is like these or what stands in their places are called 'existential verbs' because they are used to signify the existence of a thing in relation to another thing and to connect the attribute to the subject of the attribute; for example, when we say, 'Zaid exists going away' when he is going away and 'Zaid became learned.' Often these [existential verbs] are used to connect the attribute with the subject of the attribute, but often each one of them is used as an attribute itself. For example, we say 'Zaid was' and 'Zaid existed' when we wish to mean by it that he came into existence or he was created. These existential verbs are used as connectives when the attribute and the subject of attribute are both named and we wish to signify the three tenses; for example, when we say 'Zaid was eloquent,' 'Zaid will be eloquent,' or 'Zaid is eloquent.' The custom [of the Arabs] may be not to use explicitly the existential verb in the present tense but to hide it, as we say, for example, *Zaid faṣīḥ* [Zaid is eloquent], for they hide, between the two words, what is signified by the utterance *huwa faṣīḥ* [he is eloquent].[23] The existential verb, or what subsists in the place of the existential verb, is used in the present tense in this utterance.

[13] A specific property of the name is that it may be a subject of the attribute [*makhbar*] or it may be an attribute [*khabar*], [in either case] by itself without needing to be joined to another thing.[24] For example, when we say *Zaid insānun* [Zaid is a man] both

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[22] Form IV of the verb *ṣabaḥa* means 'to begin a new day, to wake up in the morning, or to be or be found in the morning,' which gives an existential sense to the verb. The existential sense is likewise present in the other two verbs identified here. Form IV of the verb **masawa* means 'to be or become in the evening.' Form II of the verb *ẓalla*, which also serves as form IV, means 'to preserve, guard, maintain, keep up.' All these definitions are taken from Wehr's lexicon.

[23] Although in Arabic *Zaid faṣīḥ* means nearly the same thing as *Zaid huwa faṣīḥ*, it is common to hide the *huwa*, the pronoun, which is in place of the word 'is.' The effect of this hiding or revealing in a particular literary context, however, may be worthy of note.

[24] The term 'property' or 'specific property' as I have translated it here in order to distinguish it from the 'attribute' is used in a precise way. A 'specific property' is an attribute that is coextensive with the individuals of the species, but it is not an essential attribute. The usual example is 'all humans laugh' because laughter is coextensive with the human species but is not an attribute that is necessary to the definition of the individuals of the species. Al-Fārābī's argument in this paragraph is that the name, although it can be either the attribute or the subject of the attribute, is not in essence only the subject of the attribute. The first time 'attribute' (*khabar*) and 'a subject of the attribute' (*makhbar ʿanhu*) occur are in section 12. They are introduced in this order there, which means the 'of it' (*ʿanhu*) refers to *khabar* and *ʿanhu* only makes sense as a complement to *khabar*, a sense which is retained with the use of the term 'subject' as the first of the two nouns in genitive relation. The examination of these terms continues in section 13, and this sequence prevails. My translation of *makhbar ʿanhu* as the 'subject of the attribute' is a combination of Dunlop's and Elamrani-Jamal's formulations. Dunlop has 'predicate' for *khabar* and 'subject of predication' for *makhbar ʿanhu*. Dunlop, "Introductory Sections," 280. Elamrani-Jamal translates *al-khabar* as 'l'attribut (l'énoncé ou l'information)' and *al-makhbar ʿanhu* as 'l'objet de l'attribution' in a similar passage (section 9–10, pages 212–13) in *Le livre des termes utilisés en logique* (*Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-Mustaʿmala fī-l-Mantīk*). For an Arabic

the attribute and the subject of the attribute is a name. As for [the specific property of] a verb, it is an attribute by itself and alone without being in need of joining to another thing; and it is not possible for it to be a subject of the attribute by itself unless it is joined to a relative clause; thus, it is not possible that you say 'he walks is so-and-so' [*sic*] unless you say 'he who walks is the man,' thus 'he walks' is joined with your term 'who.' Thus, [the verb is not in its essence the subject of the attribute because] you say that 'Zaid walks' without joining 'he walks,' which is an attribute, with a relative clause or anything else. On the other hand, many of the ancients supposed that the name has as a specific property that it is a subject of the attribute in itself and in its essence, and it is not an attribute unless it is joined to an existential verb, either explicitly or implicitly. The specific property of the verb is that, in essence and itself, it is an attribute and it is not a subject of the attribute in itself unless it is joined with a relative clause. For they supposed that when we say 'Zaid is a man' [*Zaid insānun*], 'man' is not an attribute unless the utterance 'he' [*huwa*], or what stands in its place, is explicit or implicit in it; or 'the man' only becomes an attribute, according to them, when it is joined to 'he' [*huwa*], as it is said, 'he is a man' [*huwa insānun*) or 'he was a man' [*kāna insānan*] or 'he exists as a man' [*wujidu insānan*].

[14] A specific property of the instrument is that it is neither an attribute nor the subject of the attribute, as for example when we say 'Is it?' (*hal*) and 'not' (*lā*) and 'from' (*min*). But often many of them are a part of an attribute or a part of a subject of the attribute, as when we say for example 'Zaid was in the house,' 'Zaid' is the subject of the attribute, and the attribute, we say, is 'in the house.' And we say 'was' is the existential verb which joins an attribute with a subject of the attribute and signifies the time of the existence of the attribute.

[15] Among the specific properties of the verb is that, when it is an attribute [*khabar*], it does not need anything else [namely, an instrument] to connect it with the subject of its attribute [*makhbar*]. Rather, its essence joins with the subject of the attribute; as for example when we say 'Zaid walks.' The masters of logic call the subject of the attribute [*al-makhbar*] 'the subject' [*al-mawḍūʿ*]and the attribute [*al-khabar*] they call 'the predicate' [*al-maḥmūl*].[25]

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edition and French translation of the first twenty-three of the sixty-five sections of al-Fārābī's treatise, see A. Elamrani-Jamal, *Logique Aristotélicienne et Grammaire Arabe: Études et Documents* (Paris: Vrin, 1983). Al-Fārābī introduces the terms used by the logicians for 'subject' and 'predicate' in section 15 (below) and I reserve these English terms for those usages in keeping with his aim of identifying words which are necessary for distinguishing the art of logic from that of grammar.

[25] Arabic has two sets of words for 'subject' and 'predicate.' Throughout this section, al-Fārābī has been using *makhbar* and *khabar*, themselves cognate terms, and now he uses *mawḍūʿ* and *maḥmūl*, which he introduced in the first treatise in the sequence in Bratislava and Hamidiye, *The Introduction to Logic* (also called *The Introductory Letter to Logic*), para. 7: the paragraph identifies the two main parts of a judgment. D. M. Dunlop, "Al-Fārābī's Introductory *Risālah on*

[16] The composite utterances are composed of these three genera [name, verb, and instrument], either all three or two of them. The types of the primary composite utterances are twofold, one is that whose composition is a composition of affirmation; the other is that whose composition is a composition of condition, exclusion, and restriction. Thus, those [utterances] whose composition is a composition of declaration are as we say 'Zaid is a man' and ''Amr is going away' and 'Man is an animal'; and those whose composition is a composition of condition are, for example, as we say 'Zaid, the secretary' or 'the white man' or 'a friend of Zaid,' and examples like this. Pertaining to the compositions, for some of them each part of it signifies a part of the meaning and its totality signifies the totality of the meaning, and some of them signify the totality of the meaning but their parts do not signify a part of the meaning, as for example when we say 'Qais ʿAylān' and ''Abd Shams,' and examples like this; for they signify a particular individual, but their parts, that is, ''Abd' or 'Shams,' do not signify a part of the totality of the individual. [In contrast, there are] those [compositions] of which the totality signifies the totality of the meaning and their parts are a part of this meaning, as, for example, when we say 'he who chooses wisdom,' or 'the friend of Zaid,' and 'the white man.' For those compositions of which a part of it [the composition] does not signify a part of the totality function in the manner of simple utterances. Those of which a part signifies part of the totality, the masters of logic call 'the statement,' whether its composition is a composition of restriction or a composition of declaration. The compositions which are compositions of affirmation, the masters of logic call 'the decisive statement' and 'the determination' and 'the judgment,' as for example when we say 'Zaid walks' and 'Man is an animal.'[26]

[17] Definition is a composed, restrictive statement which explains the meaning signified by a particular name by means of the things by which the meaning subsists. Description, however, is a composed, restrictive statement which explains the meaning signified by a particular name by means of the things by which the meaning does not subsist, but rather by its [the thing's] conditions or by the things which subsist by these [that is, by the conditions'] meanings. As examples, this 'wall' is a name signifying a meaning which can be explained by two statements, one of which is that it is an upright body, made of stone, or brick, or clay to carry a roof, and the second is that it is a body

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Logic," *Islamic Quarterly* 3 (1957): 224–35. Al-Fārābī continues to distinguish certain key terms used in logic from the terms used by the grammarians and the public.

[26] This declaration is a primary and unified formulation of thought and is in its essence evaluative, as the terms used to identify it in both Arabic and English indicate. Thus, al-Fārābī's account of this primary element of logic is contrary to misguided attempts to create neutral, descriptive language in the positivist tradition. The Arabic *qawl* is an equivocal term and may mean 'statement,' 'speech,' or 'argument,' but in the context of this determination of the primary and unified formulation of thought, 'statement' is most appropriate. On the translation of *qawl* as 'argument,' see Butterworth, *Averroës' Three Short Commentaries*, 137. The context in these treatises by Averroes is the arts of dialectic, rhetoric, and poetry, in which the term 'argument' is more appropriate.

with doors attached, pegs inserted in it, made with a balcony, and a man can lean against it. The first statement explains the meaning of the name 'wall' by means of the things by which it subsists, while the second explains it by means of things by which it does not subsist. For the essence of the wall is not lacking if it has no door attached to it, or does not have pegs inserted into it, or has no balcony, or no one leaning against it, whereas when there is no brick, no stone, no clay, a wall has no existence. The first statement is the definition of the wall, the second is the description. And likewise, it occurs in all other things.

[18] The aphorisms are complete in the introduction and may praise be to God as He deserves.