Historical Perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen: An Interdisciplinary Workshop

The conceptual pair of Erklären and Verstehen has been the object of philosophical and methodological debates for well over a century. Discussions – to this day – are centered around the question of whether certain objects or issues, such as those dealing with humans or society, require a special approach, different from that of the physical sciences. In the course of such philosophical discussions, we frequently find references to historical predecessors, such as Dilthey’s discussion of the relationship between “Geisteswissenschaft” and “Naturwissenschaft,” Windelband’s distinction between nomothetic and idiographic methods, or Weber’s conception of an interpretative sociology. However, these concepts are rarely placed in the historical contexts of their emergence. This workshop intends to do just that.

By inquiring into the historical context of Erklären and Verstehen, the topic of this workshop fits in well with the growing interest in the history of the philosophy of science. Scholars in this field have looked at the historical conditions under which philosophical ideas emerged, movements were formed, or debates took place. As a result of this type of work, received views about those ideas, movements and debates have been challenged. The workshop topic also corresponds to a trend within the history of science, which seeks to historicize previously unquestioned epistemological categories by describing their historical trajectories and identifying particular research contexts in which such concepts acquired specific meanings. From the perspective of the history of the philosophy of science, it is especially relevant to look at the kinds of scientific ideas that philosophers were exposed to when they formulated their views about science. Hence, it is quite natural for the historian of the philosophy of science to turn to the history of science. Conversely, a scholar interested in the historical study of epistemological categories might look at the way in which these categories were reflected in the philosophical literature at the time. Hence, an alliance between the historian of science and the historian of philosophy appears natural.

Interestingly, while historians of the philosophy of science have become more interested in the history of scientific ideas, many historians of science have moved away from a narrow focus on ideas, and investigate instead the role of material cultures, experimental activities, or political agendas. This move has enabled researchers to gain a much richer picture of scientific knowledge production, by conceptualizing science as deeply entangled in manifold social practices. In contrast, philosophers tend to focus on detailed analyses of the concepts and arguments under investigation. It was a fundamental contention of this workshop that these two approaches can be brought to bear upon each other in mutually beneficial ways. For example, the philosopher’s conceptual analyses can function as vital analytical tools for the historian of science, by bringing to the fore issues and historical constellations that might otherwise go unnoticed. Conversely, an historical appreciation may alert the philosopher to hidden premises in (or unnamed opponents of) the actors’ arguments, thereby enabling a richer understanding of the philosophical texts in question.

The workshop brought together scholars interested in mid-nineteenth to early twentieth century German-language science and philosophy, especially issues surrounding the emergence of the social sciences and humanities. The Erklären/Verstehen dichotomy was intended both as the object of analysis and the focal point for understanding a variety of different developments during the time period in question. To give a few examples: (1) While the distinction between an interpretive and an explanatory mode of investigation is sometimes aligned with the distinction between the human and the natural sciences, it was suspected that a detailed analysis might reveal that the issues negotiated at the time cut across different disciplines, schools, and practices. (2) Philosophers of the social sciences are usually aware of systematic status of the Erklären/Verstehen dichotomy, and scholars of German literature are aware of the impact of Wilhelm Dilthey’s work (especially his concept of “Erleben”) on the history of their discipline. However, the relationship between those concepts in the context of the differentiation between the social sciences and the humanities does not usually come into focus. (3) Likewise, an appreciation of the way in which Dilthey conceived of Erklären as related to a particular type of experimental practice in psychology, or how his notion of Verstehen was linked to nineteenth century debates about the philosophy of history, may be illuminating.

The above focus on Wilhelm Dilthey is for purely expository purposes and does not exhaust the topics that were discussed at the workshop. The workshop was projected to cover four aspects of Erklären/Verstehen: conceptual, practical, institutional, and comparative. However, these aspects were by no means conceived of as mutually exclusive. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of the workshop, the participants approached the conceptual pair of Erklären and Verstehen from different perspectives, thereby enabling a rich and multifaceted picture of the philosophical issues and historical dynamics at stake to form.

1. On the level of conceptual history, attention was paid to various ways in which such dichotomies were construed at the time of their emergence. For example, for any particular discussion of Erklären – as opposed to Verstehen – what were underlying notions of explanation or of interpretation? Attempts to answer this question included systematic analyses of the philosophical debates and analyses of the scientific practices of contemporary research.

2. Contributions pertaining to the practical aspect focused on research practices and tools. Questions addressed pertained to (i) the content and material conditions of research in psychology and the social sciences, and (ii) the implicit and explicit ways in which notions of Erklären and Verstehen shaped, or were shaped by, research practices.

3. Of course, the question of research practices should not be separated from the disciplinary contexts in which they took place. This, then, brings us to the institutional aspect. Questions addressed included (i) How closely were methodological or theoretical paradigms related to particular research schools? (ii) How closely were they related to disciplinary boundaries? (iii) To what extent did they define boundaries in the process of discipline formation?

4. The Erklären/Verstehen debate is usually perceived as a particularly German phenomenon. Historical analyses therefore typically focus on the specific context provided by German science and philosophy. For example, one thinks of neo-Kantian philosophy, oscillating between a positivist and an idealist variety, and associated notions of the proper place of a science of human beings. To go beyond these immediate associations, the workshop sought to introduce a comparative approach, by asking whether similar issues arose within the context of science and philosophy in other European countries or the United States (e.g., in the context of pragmatist philosophies). Questions addressed were (i) What were the similarities and differences between methods and practices in different countries? (ii) To what extent did ideas travel? (iii) To what extent do we see national idiosyncrasies?

For further information see

http://www.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/workshops/en/ErklaerenVerstehen