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Generating Experimental Knowledge

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Thomas Dohmen

Doctoral Candidate

Philosophy, University of Haifa

Homepage: http://www.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/members/tdohmen

Context and Error in the Epistemology of Scientific Experiment

Within traditional epistemology, skeptical scenarios challenge the idea of having knowledge. These scenarios demand a level of justification - which has to be delivered in order to call something 'knowledge' - that is impossible to reach. A way to deal with these skeptical scenarios is offered by an approach called 'contextualism', in which it seems reasonable to disregard skeptical scenarios in certain contexts, thereby justifying the attribution of 'knowledge' in those constrained contexts.

The project of 'Generating Experimental Knowledge' investigates the critical role of error in experimental science. Scientists use experiments to generate knowledge. They rely on various 'standard' methods to insure that the experiment provides them with correct data. By relying on these methods, scientists seem to be justified in attributing 'knowledge' to the theories that have been confirmed by experiments or to theories that follow the outcome of experiments, although possible errors have not been (individually) accounted for.

The claim of this part of the project is that, by referring to such 'standard' methods, scientists create a context of justification which enables them to attribute 'knowledge' in the same way that the epistemic contextualists create a context of justification. This is done by creating a context in which 'knowledge' can be justifiably attributed without regarding the factors that threaten this attribution of knowledge to the full extent. In contextual epistemology, there is no full defence against skeptical scenarios (these scenarios are just 'properly' ignored in most contexts), and in scientific experiment not every possible error is individually accounted for (because there is a reference to a context of 'similar' and 'related' experiments and 'standard' methodologies, some possible errors are ignored).

This PhD thesis suggests and presents an analogical relation between 'skepticism' in the theory of knowledge and 'error' in the practice of experimental science. It is an investigation into both the consequences of the concept of knowledge and epistemic skepticism for the practice of experimental science and the consequences of error in experimental science for the theory of knowledge. The main focus is on the role of context in both fields of study, since it is supposed that context determines when 'knowledge' can be correctly attributed in both fields.

This thesis will offer not only an evaluating overview of the debates of the last two decades of contextual epistemology, but will also contribute a specific perspective on the practice of experimental science from epistemic theory, thereby offering a practical case to matters that - traditionally - have always remained highly theoretical. Conversely, it will offer a deeply philosophical background of the concept of 'scientific knowledge' to the practice of scientific experimentation (which is generally thought to generate knowledge). Furthermore, the thesis will include an extensive account of the semantic issues arising through a contextual approach to science and its related conceptual terminology. It is hoped that, together, these analyses will lead to a better understanding of the relationship between the theory of knowledge (epistemology) and the attribution of 'knowledge' in experimental science.

 

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